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Abstract. This extended abstract outlines the FORTES project for the
forensic analysis of information flow properties. FORTES claims that
information flow control can be made usable as a core of an audit-control
system. For this purpose, it reconstructs workflow models from secure
log files (i.e. execution traces) and, applying security policies, analyzes
the information flows to distinguish information flows according to their
relevance. FORTES thus cannot prevent security policy violations, but
by detecting them with well-founded analysis, improve the precision of
audit controls and the generated certificates.
Approximately 70% of all business processes in use today rely on automated
workflow systems for their execution [16]. Despite the growing expenses in the
design of advanced tools for secure and compliant deployment of workflows, an
exponential growth of dependability incidents persists [8, 11, 12]. One reason for
this fact is that traditional mechanisms based on access control models fail to
enforce security properties unless they are fully known at design time. Concepts
beyond access control focusing on information flow control [17] or usage con-
trol [13] open up new paradigms to design security mechanisms for reliable and
secure IT-based workflows.
Information flow control semantically specifies reliable and secure workflows,
where reliability is the guarantee to continuously deliver correct services [5] and
security is a composite of the protection goals confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability [14]. Workflows satisfying both reliability and security requirements are
called dependable. However, the “control” part of all approaches based on “in-
formation flow” has so far been poorly achieved in terms of practical enforceable
mechanisms. In traditional information flow control with formal verification and
program analysis, any relationship (so-called interference) between an observ-
able event (low) of a workflow and a secret or classified event (high) happening
over a (covert) channel [10] denotes an error, but none of these approaches can
distinguish between security-relevant and security-irrelevant relationships in a
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business sense. This makes the resulting systems unfeasibly restrictive in many
application scenarios [15].
FORTES approaches covert channel analysis from a forensic perspective.
It claims that information flow control can be made usable as a core of an
audit system. Today, “manual” audits issue a certificate where an entrusted
third-party asserts conformant business behaviour. Certificates are generated
following “semi-formal best practice” approaches and lack well-founded, auto-
mated analysis [6, 7]. Approaches to automating audit focus largely on the simple
pattern-matching of audit-trails and policies [1, 9] and, more recently, on the use
of extensional policies with basic forms of clustering of audit-trails [3, 4]. This
fails to capture subtle attacks caused by interferences [12].
FORTES applies information flow analysis for the analysis of logs files. For
this purpose, FORTES reconstructs workflow models from secure log files [2] (i.e.
execution traces) and, applying security policies, analyzes the detected informa-
tion flows to distinguish security-relevant from security-irrelevant interferences
and covert channels. FORTES thus cannot prevent security policy violations,
but it detects them with well-founded analysis. FORTES issues automatically
generated, semantically meaningful certificates based upon reconstructed work-
flow models, the specification of dependability requirements (policies), and the
analysis of execution traces (secure logs).
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